This article presents an overview of the regulatory regime created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and its implications for small firms. We review the available evidence in three distinct domains: compliance costs, stock price reactions, and firms' decisions to exit regulated securities markets.
Introduction and Background
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted in July 2002 to strengthen corporate governance and restore investor confidence after a series of financial debacles involving some of the most prominent firms in the Unites States, including Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom. SOX and the rules implementing it have transformed the reporting obligations of public firms. Most importantly, SOX requires management and an outside auditor to assess annually the effectiveness of the firm's internal controls over financial reporting. In addition, SOX tightens disclosure rules, requires management to certify the firm's periodic reports, strengthens board independence and financial literacy requirements, and raises auditor independence standards.
While the intent behind SOX is clear, its ultimate effects on capital markets and economic growth are still under debate. Proponents of the Act argue that it alleviates investor concerns by improving transparency and the accuracy of financial reports (e.g., Cunningham (2003) , Wagner and Dittmar (2006) , Coates (2007) ). Opponents of the Act argue that it unduly increases the regulatory burden associated with being a publicly-traded firm (e.g., Coustan et al. (2004) , Ribstein (2002) , Gordon (2003) , Romano (2005) ).
For policy makers, the crux of the debate must concern SOX's net effects. There is no dispute that complying with SOX is costly, even though compliance costs have been going down of late. The more germane question is whether the cost is justified by attendant benefits (either public or private). While this question applies to all firms, it is especially salient for smaller issuers. Many of the provisions of SOX increase accounting, audit, and other general compliance costs. Because small firms have fewer resources, enjoy lesser scale economies and receive relatively little investor attention, they likely face higher average costs and derive lower average benefits from SOX. On the other hand, small firms (or at least their public investors) may also benefit more than others from the assurance that SOX provides; Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom aside, small companies have historically been more prone to financial fraud than large firms. Whether SOX strikes the right balance between costs and benefits can only be resolved empirically.
In this article, we review empirical studies of the effect of SOX on large and small firms.
Because the extant studies employ different measures to define small firms, we will clarify the definition used in each study. Our review focuses on areas in which (a) SOX might plausibly have an impact, and (b) the impact of SOX is susceptible to empirical measurement: accounting and audit costs, stock prices, and exit from the market for public capital.
The evidence we review lends some support to the proposition that SOX had a disproportionately negative impact on smaller firms, at least at its initial implementation.
However, the evidence is not conclusive, especially with regard to the effects of SOX over the long term. More research in this area is needed.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part I briefly reviews the principal reforms introduced by the Act. Part II explains why small firms might plausibly be affected by the act in a manner distinct from larger firms. Parts III through V summarize evidence on, respectively, the accounting and audit costs associated with SOX, stock price reactions to SOX, and changes in deregistration patterns after the enactment of SOX. Part VI chronicles initiatives to mitigate the effect of SOX on small firms.
I. Overview of SOX
In order to situate and motivate our later discussion, we begin by reviewing the principal provisions of SOX. At the onset, it bears noting that as a phenomenon, SOX was not a single action by Congress. Rather, the rollout of the provisions that are now identified collectively as SOX was piecemeal. The multidimensionality of its constituent reforms presents a challenge for empirical study of the effects of SOX writ large. While each component of the SOX might affect firms differently, researchers can often only examine the effects of the provisions as a whole, making fine-tuning of the regulatory environment difficult.
A. Internal Controls
The most notorious mandate introduced by SOX is a requirement to include in the firm's annual report assessments by the chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), and an outside auditor of the effectiveness of the firm's internal controls over the accuracy of financial statements. Though a relative latecomer in the cavalcade of SOX reforms, this requirement is largely regarded as the most costly requirement in SOX. As Klingsberg and Noble (2004) note: Any audit committee member or general counsel will readily tell you that the most burdensome part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has turned out not to be certifications by the CEO and CFO as to the accuracy of the financial statements, the movement toward real time disclosure as most recently exemplified by new Form 8-K, or even the non-GAAP reconciliation requirement of Regulation G. Memoranda from law firms and accounting firms following the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley and the initial SEC releases pursuant to the statute usually included only vague references to what some corporate insiders and auditors now claim has turned out to be the neutron bomb within Sarbanes-Oxley: Section 404 -Management Assessment of Internal Controls. Nowadays, Section 404 is the focus and in many circles is literally synonymous with Sarbanes-Oxley.
Section 404 has been implemented slowly, and indeed it is still not fully implemented.
Although the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) received rulemaking authority in July 
E. Audit Committees
Section 301 of SOX requires that all firms listed on national stock exchanges have audit committees composed exclusively of independent directors. Although audit committees had been required long before the enactment of SOX, the composition and duties of these committees had been mostly unregulated. In 1999, the national stock exchanges began requiring that audit committees be independent and state in their charters that the auditor is accountable to the board of directors and that the audit committee is authorized to select, evaluate, and replace the auditor.
These changes, however, allowed boards to name one non-independent director to the audit committee and exempted small businesses from the new requirements.
SOX broadly defines an independent director as a director who does not receive any fee from the firm other than for being a director and who is not an affiliated person of the firm or any of its subsidiaries. 68 FR 18788 (Apr. 16, 2003) . The rule contains a safe harbor under which a person who is not an executive officer or a shareholder owning 10% or more of any class of voting stock of a company will be deemed not to control the company. 
II. The Special Case of Small Firms
Before we review the evidence, it is useful to examine why one might plausibly expect that SOX's impact on small firms may be different from its impact on their larger counterparts.
The reason, in a nutshell, is that both the costs of complying with SOX and the potential benefits of SOX can be larger for small firms.
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Small firms may incur relatively higher SOX-related compliance costs for a number of reasons. First, they may experience a disproportionately large increase in audit fees because some of the costs associated with establishing, maintaining, and evaluating internal controls over financial reporting are fixed and because small firms often lack the staff to perform in-house the additional accounting work (Wolkoff (2005) (Jan. 28, 2003) , 68 FR 6005 (Feb. 5, 2003) . 18 Prior research suggests that small firms derived a lower net benefit from being public than large firms even before SOX (Pagano and Röell (1998) , Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) ).
problem for all firms, but small firms are affected more because they tend to lack in-house staff to respond to the new environment.
Third, the increased demand for accounting services following the enactment of SOX raised audit costs for small firms in particular. Survey results indicate that, after the enactment of SOX, large accounting firms stopped working with small clients, citing lack of profitability, risk, and capacity constraints, forcing these clients to seek other accountants (GAO (2006)). The resulting imbalance in the market for accounting services could not be resolved quickly because entry into this regulated market is slow.
While the main concern expressed by small businesses about SOX revolves around accounting costs, other issues have been raised as well. One concern is that some of the new rules make it difficult for firms to attract individuals to serve as directors because they increase liability exposure and tighten independence standards. This concern might be greater in the case of small businesses because serving on their boards is less prestigious. Consistently, Linck, Netter, and Yang (2007) find that, after the enactment of SOX, director fees as a percentage of net sales increased significantly more for small firms than for large ones. Another concern is that preoccupation with compliance discourages taking business risks. This can be especially problematic for small firms at the start of their growth.
It is important to note that the potential benefits of SOX can also be higher for small firms. The goal of SOX was to restore investor confidence by increasing transparency.
Achieving this goal can be especially beneficial to small firms because their limited accounting personnel and limited exposure to public scrutiny make their financial statements prone to inaccuracies (Doyle, Ge, and McVay (2007) ).
Of course, this argument rests on the assumption that, without regulation, investors would have less information about small firms than about large firms. It is also possible that the contrary is true, namely that the regulation benefits large firms more because their operations tend to be more complex, and therefore more difficult for investors to process and distill.
Ultimately, whether on balance SOX imposes a net loss on firms and, if so, whether the loss is larger for small firms, is an empirical question. We turn to this question next.
III. Evidence on Accounting and Audit Costs
Several studies document an increase in public firms' accounting and audit costs since the enactment of SOX. However, they differ about the relative impact on small firms. Asthana, Balsam and Kim (2004) find that the average ratio of audit fees to assets increased between 2000 and 2002, and that bigger and riskier firms, and clients of the "Big Four" audit firms experienced a larger increase in absolute audit fees. They attribute the latter finding to decreased competition in the market for audits of multinational firms. In an analysis of the financial statements of 97 for large firms. For small firms, total Section 404 costs represented 0.24% of the average revenue in the second year after the enactment of SOX, compared to 0.38% in the previous year.
The corresponding figures for larger firms were 0.05% and 0.11% of average revenue, respectively.
The surveyed auditors attributed the decline in total Section 404 costs to efficiencies gained from a year's experience in implementing and assessing internal controls and from the fact that documentation that had been performed in the first year did not need to be replicated.
There was, however, an increase in non-404 audit fees after the first year, which auditors attributed to new non-404 audit standards, higher salaries due to increased demand for accounting personnel, and additional compliance requirements. Hartman (2005 Hartman ( , 2006 (2006)). The study finds that audit fees constituted a higher percentage of revenues for small public firms before the enactment of SOX, and that this disparity increased after the enactment of SOX, especially for small firms that filed internal control reports. Table 1 summarizes the study's findings. Source: GAO (2006) As Table 1 illustrates, for firms with less than $75 million in market capitalization that filed internal control reports, the median audit fee increased from 0.64% of revenues in 2003 to 1.14% in 2004. For firms with more than $1 billion in market capitalization that filed internal control reports, the median audit fee increased from 0.07% to 0.13% of revenues during the same period.
The GAO (2006) surveyed firms with less than $700 million in market capitalization and less than $100 million in revenues that filed internal control reports in 2004. 158 firms out of 591 that were contacted completed the survey. They reported having paid consulting fees ranging from $3,000 to more than $1.4 million for assistance in meeting the new requirements.
Most firms reported that they needed to make significant changes to their internal controls and many reported expenses for hiring additional staff. Firms also reported that their CEOs and CFOs spent as much as 90% of their time on compliance, forcing them to defer investments.
Other provisions of SOX might also have increased costs of the smaller firms. For example, 69% of the surveyed firms reported that the tightened auditor independence standards forced them to pay additional fees for tax advice. In addition, about half of the firms retained outside counsel to draft charters for board committees and a code of ethics, and to handle CEO and CFO certifications.
In sum, the studies described above provide evidence that SOX increased public firms' accounting and audit costs regardless of the company size; that before the passage of SOX, audit costs were already disproportionately higher for small firms; that the disparity increased after the enactment of SOX, especially for small firms that were subject to Section 404; and that the costs declined for all firms between the first year and the second year after the enactment of SOX.
A key attraction of the accounting studies is that they provide concrete, company-specific information that is at least somewhat reflective of firms' actual compliance costs. At the same time, the accounting studies are self-limiting for a few reasons. First, they present a challenge of discerning whether the increased costs are due solely to the new regulatory terrain or also reflect preexisting costs that had been previously expended elsewhere. 19 Second, and perhaps more significantly, the accounting studies do not provide insights about the benefits of SOX.
Accordingly, another area where researchers have attempted forays is in the use of stock market fluctuations as a reflection of whether SOX has created or destroyed economic value. It is to these studies that we now turn.
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For example, even before SOX public companies were required to maintain internal financial controls under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, but those controls did not have to be audited. After SOX, some of the costs of designing internal control systems and protocols may have been (rationally) offloaded to auditors, a shift that would visibly increase audit fees, but the reduction in internal costs might not be easily detected within the company's books and records.
IV. Evidence on Market Reactions and Firm Value
The evidence on abnormal stock returns around events leading to the enactment and implementation of SOX is, in a word, mixed. (2007)) and July 25, 2002 (when SOX was enacted). She finds negative returns.
She also finds that firms experienced lower returns if they purchased non-audit services from their auditors, had complex operations, or had weak shareholder rights, suggesting that firms more affected by SOX lost more value. She does not find a relation between returns and firm market capitalization. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) (averaging $1,876 million in market capitalization). They find that small firms with less independent boards and weaker internal controls (which they assume to be affected by SOX) underperformed small firms with more independent boards and stronger internal controls (which they assume to have been unaffected). Affected large firms performed similarly to unaffected large firms, and in some regressions performed better. Litvak (2007a) compares the returns to foreign firms cross-listed in the United States with the returns to other foreign firms matched by market capitalization and industry. Her study period begins in January 17, 2002 (as in Wintoki (2007) and Zhang (2007) ) and October 22, 2002 (when the SEC adopted a rule requiring firms to introduce internal control procedures).
She finds lower returns to cross-listed firms regardless of firm size. The effect of SOX on cross-listed firms may be unique. In particular, legal change is likely to present particularly thorny obstacles to cross-listed firms because they must comply with two regulatory regimes simultaneously. Cross-listed firms also tend to be large and belong to particular industries. Litvak (2007b) finds that Overall, while the event studies provide mixed evidence regarding the effect of SOX on large firms, they appear to be consistent in finding a negative effect on small firms. As noted above, an advantage of these event studies over accounting studies is that they capture the net value that the market attaches to an anticipated regulatory change. A limitation of these studies is that they are best suited to studying sharp regime shifts, and less well suited to studying a process of piecemeal regulation. With SOX, the change took shape over time, as the law was implemented. Before then it was difficult to predict how various reforms would play out.
Investors expected change, but did not know what form it would take. Deregistration studies, described next, examine how the market viewed SOX a few months later, when some of the uncertainty around the new law had been resolved.
V. Evidence on Deregistrations
We now review the evidence concerning the relationship between SOX and firm decisions to exit the market for public capital. Section 12(g)(4) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provides that public firms can deregister their stock with the SEC and suspend being subject to federal securities law once the number of their shareholders drops below 300. Firms can deregister by arranging for private acquirers to buy their entire stock ("going private") or by cashing out small shareholders to reduce the number of shareholders below 300 ("going dark").
Unlike going dark, going private can achieve a number of business goals other than avoiding securities law. For example, Jensen (1989) argues that going private lowers agency costs by concentrating ownership and increasing leverage. Kaplan (1989a) , Baker and Wruck small firms reacted more negatively to SOX when she uses the same sample as Litvak (2007a) but measures the effect using the post-SOX change in the ratio of the market value of the firm's debt and equity to the replacement cost of its assets.
(1990), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) , and Smith (1990) find improvements in profitability and operating efficiency in firms after going private, while Ofek (1994) finds no similar improvements after failed attempts to go private. Moreover, as Kaplan (1989b) illustrates, going private can yield tax savings.
Studies of the two types of transactions suggest that going-dark transactions are more clearly related to avoiding the cost of being public, especially after the enactment of SOX, than going-private transactions.
Block (2004) often than indirect costs of being public. Firms also cited advantages of being private, such as reduced pressure to generate quick profits and the ability to avoid disclosing information that may benefit competitors.
The multitude of factors affecting the decision to deregister makes it difficult to isolate the effect of SOX on deregistration. For example, financial market liquidity around the enactment of SOX could have increased the willingness of private investors to pursue acquisitions independent of SOX. 23 Similarly, the weakness of the public capital market at that time could have independently encouraged firms to exit this market. Maupin, Bidwell, and Ortegren (1984) , for example, report that financial officers commonly cite undervaluation by the market as a reason for going private. 24 Lerner (1994) and Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) find that the likelihood of an initial public offering decreases when stock prices are low. Benninga, Helmantel, and Sarig (2005) develop a model in which going public is positively related, and going private is negatively related, to stock prices.
There is reason to believe that the weakness of the public capital market around the enactment of SOX increased the pressure on firms to go private. According to Block (2004) , almost 40% of firms that deregistered after the enactment of SOX cited the absence of liquidity in the public capital market and the absence of opportunity for a secondary market as one of the primary costs of being public. 25 Indeed, The Economist (2003a Economist ( , 2003b notes that dwindling 23 Holstein (2004 ), MacFayden (2002 ), and Carney (2005 , for example, report that the ready availability of private equity financing around the enactment of SOX fueled going-private transactions.
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Whether the belief held by financial officers of firms that go private that the market undervalues their firms is founded is a separate matter. Lee (1992) finds no evidence to support it.
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The Appendix provides examples of rationales given by firms to their decision to go private or to go dark after the enactment of SOX. profits and low stock prices induced going-private transactions around the enactment of SOX not only in the United States. Kamar, Karaca-Mandic, and Talley (2007) separate the effects of SOX from the effect of other contemporaneous factors using foreign firms as a control group. Defining "small" firms as firms in the sample's bottom quartile of market value (less than $15 million), they find that, in the first year after the enactment of SOX, the probability that small public firms undergoing acquisitions will be bought by private acquirers (rather than by other public firms) increased for American firms by 53% (from 43% to 66%) attributable to SOX. The study finds no effect among large firms or in the second year after the enactment of SOX, and interprets the latter finding as indication that maladapted firms went private immediately to avoid initial compliance with the new requirements, leaving behind public firms that were better suited to the new regulatory environment.
While the comparison to foreign firms screens out the effects of market changes, it does not separate the effect of SOX from the effect of other forms of scrutiny that tightened in the United States around the same time. SOX was not the only response to the corporate scandals of the late 1990s. Courts, regulators, stock exchanges, and investors intensified their scrutiny of public firms in additional ways. 26 Each of these non-SOX changes could have raised the cost of 26 For example, a numerous scholars have documented how the scandals that precipitated SOX caused judges in corporate cases to be more sympathetic to allegations of mismanagement than ever before (Strine (2002); Marcus (2003) ; Loomis (2003); Subramanian (2003) ). Moreover, roughly simultaneously with the passage of SOX, Congress dramatically increased the budget of the SEC (Rogers (2002) ). The SEC, in turn, intensified its market monitoring activity, leading Loomis (2003) (Nov. 4, 2003 ), 68 FR 64154 (Nov. 12, 2003 ; Release No. 34-48863, Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change by the American Stock Exchange LLC (Dec. 1, 2003 ), 68 FR 68432 (Dec. 8, 2003 . The changes were made at the SEC's prodding. See Securities and Exchange Commission Press Release No. 2002-23, being public. Therefore, the study compares the combined effect of SOX and these related changes to contemporaneous trends abroad. Moreover, the study focuses on public firms that were acquired. It does not measure the effect that SOX may have had on public firms that were not acquired, or its effect on private firms' decisions to go public.
VI. Proposals to Mitigate the Effect of SOX on Small Firms
Since the enactment of SOX, the SEC has taken several actions to address the concerns of small firms. First, it extended the Section 404 compliance deadline time after time for nonaccelerated filers. The most recent extension is still in force. Second, in March 2005, it formed an advisory committee to assess the implications of SOX for small firms. In April 2006, the committee presented its final report, in which it recommended scaling down the requirements under Section 404 for firms whose stock market capitalization is between $128 million and $787 million ("Smallcap firms"), and further scaling down these requirements for firms whose stock market capitalization is less than $128 million ("Microcap firms"). 27 Alternatively, the report recommended exempting from Section 404 Smallcap firms with less than $250 million in annual revenues but more than $10 million in annual product revenue, and Microcap firms with between $125 and $250 million in annual revenue.
The SEC rejected the idea of creating special carve-outs for small firms. Microcap firms comprise 1% of stock market capitalization in the United States, and smallcap firms comprise another 5%. Together, however, they account for 78.5% of U.S. public firms.
404, work with the PCAOB to improve its audit standard, and ensure that PCAOB inspections of auditors focus on efficiency. The SEC also announced that it would postpone the Section 404 requirements for non-accelerated filers until the guidelines and the audit standard are released.
In December 2006, the SEC set the compliance deadline as the end of 2007 for management certification of internal controls and the end of 2008 for auditor attestation. In May 2007, the SEC adopted interpretive guidelines to Section 404 premised on scaling internal controls to firm size, materiality to financial results, and risk of misstatement, and the PCAOB adopted a companion audit standard to replace the standard from 2004.
Conclusion
In this article, we reviewed the evidence on the effects of SOX on small firms and large firms in three areas: accounting and audit costs; stock prices; and deregistration decisions. Table   3 offers a concise summary of the literature as it now stands. Going private
The rate of going-private transactions increased for small firms in the first year after SOX. There was no effect on large firms or in the second year after SOX.
Three factors make comparison of the studies difficult. First, the studies define small firms differently. Second, the studies examine different periods and -except for CRA (2005, 2006) , Leuz, Triantis, and Wang (2006) , and Kamar, Karaca-Mandic, and Talley (2007) -do not distinguish between short-term effects and long-term effects. Third, the studies differ in design and in the degree to which they control for factors other than SOX that may have affected their results.
There is ample evidence that SOX increased public firms' accounting and audit costs.
Before the passage of SOX, audit fees had already constituted a higher portion of revenues for smaller firms. This disparity between small firms and large firms increased after the enactment of SOX, especially for small firms that complied with Section 404. Comparing audit fees, however, is only the first step towards evaluating the effect of SOX on small firms. The question is whether the higher costs that small firms bear are matched by higher benefits.
Event studies analyzing SOX's impact on firm value represent one attempt to answer this question. These studies provide mixed results, which seem to depend on the choice of events and control variables. Nevertheless, almost all studies that distinguish between firms based on size find that SOX affected small firms more adversely than large firms and that its effect on small firms was negative.
Studies of firm deregistrations are another effort to capture the net effect of SOX. They too produce mixed results. Most studies find that SOX increased the number of going-dark transactions, with moderate or no impact on going-private transactions. However, these studies do not separate the effect of SOX from that of contemporaneous factors, such as financial market liquidity, which could have increased the rate of deregistration. Kamar, Karaca-Mandic, and Talley (2007) use a control group of foreign firms to address this problem. They find that, in the first year after the enactment of SOX, the rate of going-private transactions in small public firm acquisitions increased in the United States more than abroad. In contrast, they do not find a negative effect among large firms.
Overall, the evidence offers qualified support for the view that SOX had a negative effect on the value of small firms, at least initially. This evidence should be interpreted with caution, however, for at least three reasons.
First, other hypotheses unrelated to the wisdom of SOX as a policy vehicle might also be consistent with these findings. For example, the event studies noted above measure the effects of SOX by looking at investor beliefs (as capitalized in stock price) at notable moments surrounding the enactment of SOX. But given the novelty of the requirements that SOX introduced and the delegation its provisions made to regulatory bodies and stock exchanges, investors could easily have been wrong about the future effects of SOX.
Second, one must account for the possibility that increasing compliance costs for small firms was warranted. For example, the deregistration studies suggest that SOX tipped the scales for some small firms in favor of exiting the public capital market. While on first blush this appears undesirable, it is possible that the exiting firms were opaque, risky, or prone to financial misstatements, and that the firms that remained public benefited from SOX more than the exiting firms lost.
Finally, both event studies and deregistration studies examine the initial period following SOX's enactment. It is important to understand the extent to which those initial effects represented one-time issues, or recurring ones. The decline in compliance costs since the enactment of SOX has already been noted, and the recent interpretive guidelines and audit standards may further decrease costs. Consequently, the puzzle surrounding the overall effect of SOX is far from over. Additional empirical studies will almost certainly inform the policy debate for years to come.
addition, it is unlikely that Coast Dental could issue additional Shares to obtain financing because of the low trading price, low trading volume and illiquidity of the Shares.
The Board also believes that there are considerable costs and detriments in remaining a publicly-traded company. In addition to the substantial time expended by Coast Dental management, the legal, auditing, accounting and other expenses involved in the preparation, filing and dissemination of annual and other periodic reports are considerable and will likely increase significantly in the future as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Additionally, management believes that required public disclosures under the Exchange Act give its competitors, some of which are not publicly-traded companies, certain information and insights about us that may help such competitors in competing against us.
